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How do social innovations come to the fore? Are they exclusively based on the 
entrepreneurial spirit of change makers? And what makes social innovations work? 
Can a solid business plan make innovations sustainable? In other words, does sur-
vival of the fittest also hold true for social innovations? From this Darwinist per-
spective, social innovations are perceived as new products geared towards address-
ing new societal needs in competitive markets.
We question whether this perspective, based on microeconomics, really helps us 
understand how social innovations emerge, are further developed and finally inte-
grated into the repertoire of welfare politics at the local level. Instead, we argue that, 
particularly at the local level, the emergence, development and firm establishment 
of social innovations constitute a political process whose outcome is highly depen-
dent on both a decisive set of environmental factors, including coalition building, 
and specific constellations of actors. From our point of view, social innovations are 
highly embedded in their environment.
And indeed, environments differ significantly. Research has demonstrated that 
some environmental factors, like freedom, diversity and density of contacts, are 
correlated with innovation (Evers et al. 2014). That is why cities have always been 
places of innovation (Cattacin 2011). But the innovative capacity of cites differs, 
and we think that these differences are related not only to the factors mentioned but 
also to strategies and dynamics linked to government decisions and lobbies in the 
economic and social spheres. In particular, analyses of social innovation have to 
take into account these decisions and these actors. European cities, which are at the 
centre of our analysis, stand out for their diversity in terms of government set-up, 
social-policy traditions and local political cultures.
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Hence, we argue that social innovations have to be analysed against the back-
ground of their specific contexts or, to put it differently, that social innovations at 
the local level are the outcome of a political process and as such a reflection of city-
specific (welfare) cultures—the institutional perspective—and local governance ar-
rangements—the political perspective. These city-specific settings create both op-
portunity structures and constraints for new ideas and concepts that are put forward 
by agents in alliance with like-minded persons and brokers and which develop into 
locally embedded social innovations.
Although European cities are renowned for their specificity, their local tradi-
tions and their particular flair, the rich empirical material we have collected within 
the framework of the European project Welfare Innovations at the Local Level in 
Favour of Cohesion (WILCO)1 allows us to identify groups of similar urban-gov-
ernance arrangements.
This chapter provides portraits of these arrangements, which constitute the 
bedrock on which social innovations are built, based on a comparative analysis of 
governance and social innovations in the 20 cities included in the project. Doubt-
lessly, characterising specific constellations and hence developing a typology of 
governance arrangements that might enable, foster or discourage processes of social 
innovation constitute a courageous undertaking. We are aware that the governance 
arrangements we identify do not do justice to the complexity and variety of gover-
nance constellations to be found in European cities. But the typology of constella-
tions we lay out here may be helpful for researchers of urban governance as well 
as policymakers trying to give meaning to the puzzling world of new ideas and ap-
proaches grouped together under the umbrella term social innovation. The typology 
may also help us better understand why some social innovations face a tough time 
being accepted and integrated into local welfare politics.
Of course, we have not developed the typology out of the blue. The four specific 
governance arrangements we identified are the outcome of in-depth analysis of the 
rich empirical material that researchers from ten different countries collected from 
Amsterdam to Warsaw.2 From a methodological point of view, we took advantage 
of various distinct streams of research and theory building. In particular, we have 
drawn on the results and the repertoire of theoretical approaches put forward by 
urban sociology, and especially comparative urban governance, policy analysis and 
welfare research. We specifically tried to link together recent approaches in urban 
sociology and local governance.
The first section of this chapter outlines the theoretical approaches we refer to 
in order to develop a typology of different urban governance arrangements in core 
1 For details on the project see www.wilcoproject.eu and the first publications of this EU-financed 
comparative project in Ranci et al. 2014. The project involves 20 European cities from ten different 
countries, namely Stockholm, Malmö, Birmingham, Dover, Milan, Brescia, Barcelona, Pamplona, 
Warsaw, Płock, Zagreb, Varaždin, Berlin, Münster, Lille, Nantes, Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Geneva 
and Bern.
2 Data were collected from various administrative and political documents linked to debates in lo-
cal parliaments, local newspaper articles, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups organised 
with the intent of clarifying stakeholders’ diverging or shared positions.
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welfare domains. The second section describes how we analysed and systematised 
the empirical data in order to develop our typology of four urban welfare gov-
ernance arrangements, and it offers an analysis of the common trends throughout 
Europe that trigger the need for social innovations in urban settings because estab-
lished social-policy routines and welfare services no longer meet the demands and 
needs of major parts of the urban population. The key third section describes the 
four ideal types of urban governance arrangements. The conclusion summarises our 
findings and discusses the nexus between the identified urban governance arrange-
ments and the emergence and development of social innovations in European cities.
2.1  State of the Art: The Governance Approach
In recent years, the social sciences have moved away from simplistic one-size-fits-
all analyses and increasingly turned towards more complex and multi-layered meth-
odological approaches. A textbook example of this trend is the shift from the study 
of government to the study of governance. Indeed, the concept of governance, first 
used by scholars of international relations, has become ubiquitous in the social sci-
ences (Levi-Faur 2012). From an analytical point of view, governance stands for 
horizontality in the sense of non-hierarchical modes of co-ordination, steering and 
decision-making, in which, in contrast to classical top-down government, new con-
stellations of actors are involved, among them, besides government officials, stake-
holders such as representatives from civil-society organisations and the business 
community. As such, governance is used as synonymous with regulation through 
networks of agents, which constitutes a third mode of coordination besides market 
and hierarchy (Powell 1990).
But governance is not restricted to describing how decisions are made; the con-
cept also involves a structural component, the limited set of options that are embed-
ded in a distinctive local culture. A governance arrangement, therefore, encom-
passes the constellation of actors in a given setting as well as path dependency, 
or the prevailing and hence limited set of choices that are inherent to a particular 
urban context. Simply speaking, urban governance constitutes the set of rules by 
which a city operates. However, urban governance arrangements are not simply a 
set of rules imposed by local politicians and government officials; instead, they are 
the outcome of complex coalition-building processes through which core values 
are framed, and in which multiple stakeholders are involved. Urban governance 
arrangements are highly influenced by local traditions and cultures, and they are 
embedded in and hence affected by multi-layered institutional settings, including 
supranational frameworks, specific national administrative structures (federal or 
unitary state, self-government) and particular local and national welfare regimes 
(Ferrera 2005).
The ubiquitous use of the concept of governance has created a situation in which 
urban sociologists unanimously declare that it is very difficult and perhaps unreal-
istic to comprehend most recent developments in urban settings and cities through 
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any single orientation or theoretical framework (Blanco 2013). This is particularly 
the case in the field of comparative urban studies. Although the so-called classical 
schools of urban sociology (Lin and Mele 2012), with their focus on the analysis of 
urban structures, processes, changes and problems, are still acknowledged as an im-
portant point of departure, they are no longer exclusive points of reference. Instead, 
recent scholarship in urban sociology favours multifaceted approaches that build 
on various traditions and models that previously enjoyed a stand-alone position and 
were treated as distinct paradigms (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).
2.1.1  The European-City Approach
For analyses of how cities cope with current challenges and try to reconcile social 
and economic policies, urban sociologists nowadays turn to what is called an in-
tegrated approach to urban governance (DiGaetano and Strom 2003) that builds 
on different theoretical perspectives and combines distinctive methodological ap-
proaches (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Kazepov 2005). In their seminal and widely 
cited article “The European City”, Häussermann and Haila identify four theoretical 
traditions of urban sociology, each of which provides useful insights into urbanism. 
In particular, they refer to the work of Georg Simmel, the Chicago School, political 
economy and the “global city” perspective. However, they advise against trying to 
ground empirical urban studies in a single “abstract urban model” (Häussermann 
and Haila 2005, p. 43) such as those developed by the Chicago or the Regulation 
Schools. Instead, in accordance with the work of Bagnasco and Le Galès (2000), 
they underline the specificity of the European city.
In the tradition of Max Weber, Häusermann and Haila argue convincingly that 
we must acknowledge the special features of European cities that make them dis-
tinct from cities in other parts of the world. The most important feature of the Eu-
ropean city is its multi-faceted character. In the words of Bagnasco and Le Galès, 
European cities are simultaneously “political and social actors and […] local soci-
eties” (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000, p. 3). Hence, in contrast to cities in other re-
gions, European cities traditionally constitute stand-alone arenas for policymaking, 
although there are significant differences with respect to the degree of autonomy 
European cities enjoy from their respective national governments.
In particular, since the heyday of industrialisation and urbanisation in the nine-
teenth century, the so-called social question has always been a central topic for 
European cities (Isin 2008, p. 273). In Europe, the welfare state began locally within 
internal city borders. Since then, the guaranteed provision of public services by city 
governments has emerged as a further key feature of the distinctiveness of Euro-
pean cities (Kazepov 2005, p. 13). Finally, citizens’ involvement in urban affairs, 
either through local self-governance or via civil society and its broad spectrum of 
organisations and initiatives, adds an additional facet to the specific character of 
the European city. But despite these distinguishing characteristics, European cities 
also display an impressive variety. Here regional differences and hence cultural 
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aspects come into the picture. As Häussermann and Haila have correctly remarked, 
in Europe there are “remarkable differences between cities with different welfare 
regimes and different political-institutional and cultural contexts” (2005, p. 50).
2.1.2  Analysing Urban Governance
In our WILCO research, we have focused on conceptualising the European city 
while simultaneously acknowledging the empirical variance among European cit-
ies and in particular among cities within any given country. Drawing on the re-
sults of studies of policy analysis and urban governance, a key point of departure 
is the recognition of the embeddedness or nestedness of governance arrangements 
(Granovetter 1985) within complex environments. In accordance with DiGaetano 
and Strom (2003), and in line with comparative policy-analysis studies (Kazepov 
2008), we differentiate between the following (Fig. 2.1):
3ROLWLFDO$FWRUV,QVWLWXWLRQDO0LOLHX3ROLWLFDO&XOWXUH6WUXFWXUDO&RQWH[W &XOWXUDO,QWHUPHGLDWLRQRIVWUXFWXUDOFRQWH[WDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOPLOLHX,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUPHGLDWLRQRIFXOWXUHDQGSROLWLFDODFWRUV,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUPHGLDWLRQRIVWUXFWXUDOFRQWH[WDQGSROLWLFDODFWRUV
Fig. 2.1  An integrated approach to urban governance. (Source: DiGaetano and Strom 2003, 
p. 373)
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• The institutional context of administrative structures and state organisation
• The welfare-regime context in which the local welfare regime is embedded
• The local political culture as an expression or outcome of specific norms and 
values
These environmental parameters serve as the background or—to put it differently—
set of coalition-building opportunities for actors who aim to develop and stabilise 
social innovations as remedies for current social problems. At the same time, how-
ever, these institutional structures or parameters might also significantly hinder so-
cial innovation. In particular, metropolitan cities, thanks to their cultural and ethnic 
diversity hubs for innovativeness and productivity (Florida 2005), are not necessar-
ily prone to making social innovations sustainable by integrating new concepts and 
ideas into the repertoire of local welfare politics.
2.1.3  Urban Welfare Governance Arrangements
In order to understand the multiple challenges faced by cities, we developed an 
analytical scheme that makes it possible to reconstruct why specific decisions were 
or were not made. We tried to identify the agents that contest social policies and 
propose a new way to handle them—through policy brokers that mediate between 
different coalitions’ values and orientations—but also to comprehend the values, 
politics, technical constraints and especially expert discourses that have been de-
veloped by local epistemic communities (Majone 1997). The latter define the core 
ideas of what good local welfare practices are, i.e. what successful or innovative 
efforts to combat social inequality or encourage social cohesion look like. Epis-
temic communities are not only responsible for the coherence of local discourses 
regarding how policies should be implemented or problems should be interpreted 
but also related to other networks of specialists and stakeholders, which creates 
convergences between cities and policies at all levels of regulation (Ferrera 1996).
There are at least two approaches to analysing core values. The first is that of 
Sabatier, who assumes that there exist coalitions of values (or belief systems3) and 
power relationships between these coalitions in specific policy areas or constella-
tions of actors (Sabatier 1998, 1999). A coalition is a discursively coherent group 
that produces intersubjectively shared realities or truths, which are then reflected in 
the group’s discourses and in documents.
3 According to Sabatier, building on the philosophy of science by Lakatos (1970), a belief system 
is made up of three strata: the deep core, a set of normative axioms (what is fair, values such as 
freedom, defence of equality rather than preservation of status differences, etc.); the near core, 
which is about policy-oriented approaches and consists of general choices regarding the relevant 
patterns of intervention; and secondary aspects, which consist of instrumental decisions and the 
search for relevant information to implement specific public programs.
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The second is the approach of Jobert and Muller, who analyse public administra-
tion’s global and sectorial value orientations, which they call referential4 (Jobert 
and Muller 1987). Value orientations can be found easily in official public admin-
istration documents and debates in the local parliament that also reflect coalitions. 
We have tried to combine these two approaches by not only describing general and 
sectorial orientations, or configurations of coalitions of differences, but also focus-
ing on the coherences and contrasts between majorities and minorities, and between 
the public administration’s general and sectorial orientations.
2.1.4  Social Policies at the City Level
Cities are changing from a hierarchical model of governance to a heterarchical 
(Willke 1992) one, with many centres of decision. This change can lead to the hori-
zontal integration of actors in the city, synergies between the producers of services 
and even solidarity in the city if the different actors are recognised as producers and 
if their resources can be combined.5 But this combination can take different forms, 
as indicated by studies on the alternative orientations of the local welfare state in the 
areas of social and health services (Blanke et al. 1986). For a given orientation to 
be successful, the actors involved have to recognise each other’s relevant role in the 
creation of a workable urban society. But in relation to disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods or vulnerable individuals, it is clear that only capability-building policies lead 
to the creation of new (and autonomous) resources.
As Donzelot and Estèbe argued in their significant work on the état animateur 
(or enabling state) in French suburbs, the shift from a paternalistic to a capabil-
ity-building policy helped improve living conditions in these neighbourhoods 
(Donzelot and Estèbe 1994). Urban development policies for these areas provided a 
kind of self-governance that empowered the powerless—although one may wonder 
whether this outcome was the product of a planned strategy on the part of the en-
abling state or just an accidental side effect.
In any case, this policy was discontinued in the 1990s—as a result of financial 
cutbacks, and not because the policy had failed. As a consequence, and as many 
authors have pointed out, living conditions once again deteriorated (Kokoreff and 
Lapeyronnie 2013). In other words, incorporating the resources of the poorest 
people requires that they have the opportunity to develop their own resources—an 
4 We aim to understand the referential of the local welfare system, that is, the set of beliefs, values 
and technologies shaping how participants deal with social inequalities at the local level. More 
precisely, the referential refers to three dimensions: cognitive, normative and instrumental. The 
cognitive dimension regards how people interpret and define the problems that should be solved; 
the normative dimension is about values taken into account in the definition of problems and the 
implementation of measures to resolve them; the instrumental dimension regards the principles of 
action through which plans and programs to solve problems considered relevant or legitimate are 
separated from those that are considered illegitimate.
5 See Evers on the logic of “synergetic welfare mixes” (Evers 1993).
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opportunity they generally take advantage of. This is an investment strategy that has 
been well documented by Sen’s analyses on the building of capabilities (see, e.g., 
Sen 1992).
This political strategy of social responsibility is not necessarily opposed to a 
city’s economic-growth strategy. The growth machine (Molotch 1976) needs social 
policies to be effective as an innovation regime (Häussermann and Wurtzbacher 
2005). That is why our analysis was sensitive to the relationship between economic 
and social policies.6
2.2  Twenty Cities Compared
Based on these concepts and on the empirical analysis of 20 cities, we have devel-
oped a series of variables that reflect the political context, coalitions, orientations 
and values in the area of social policies and the context in which social policies are 
produced.7 These variables are at the core of the empirical analysis in each of the 20 
cities (Cattacin et al. 2012) and have been treated as independent variables whose 
specific constellations explain why social innovation takes place. In particular, in 
both the case studies and this comparative analysis, we have focussed on variables 
able to describe the political context, value orientations and conditions of social-
policy production.
The political context has been measured with the following variables:
1. Local government making intercity competition a top priority. With this variable, 
we measured the intensity with which governance is oriented towards growth 
and the attraction of elites (Molotch 1976).
2. Rescaling and deregulation policies at the national level. This variable measures 
the pressure on cities from national decisions to take responsibility for social 
policies (Kazepov 2005).
3. Political coalitions governing the city. With this variable, we measured the size 
of a coalition governing the city. It informs us about the strength of decisions 
taken by urban governments.
4. Social democracy or economic liberalism as the dominant orientation. This vari-
able identifies the general reference system in the city.
6 Traditionally, economic and social policies were thoroughly interwoven. As outlined in Esping-
Andersen’s seminal The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), capitalist economies and so-
cial policies developed concurrently with the welfare state, which either buffered the negative side 
effects of economic development or even facilitated economic growth by providing the necessary 
resources or supporting a business-friendly culture (Kaufmann 2015).
7 The 20 cities were part of the WILCO project and chosen heuristically with the idea to represent 
the different parts of the European urban landscape. Each country is represented by two cities, 
permitting to verify the impact of the nation-state but also the autonomy of cities inside a national 
and international legal framework. A secondary criterion was the presence, in these countries, of 
experienced research groups known by the research leaders of the WILCO project.
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 5. Co-operation or confrontation between social and economic lobbies at the local 
level and the attitude of the economic lobbies towards social welfare. This 
variable measures the level of conflict or co-operation between economic and 
social interests (Häussermann 2008).
 6. Strong external political influence on the local level regarding social policy (in 
particular through the policies of the European Union (EU) and the European 
Social Fund). This variable measures the independence of the city in develop-
ing solutions to social challenges.
The value orientations in the area of social policies were operationalised with the 
following variables:
 7. Orientation towards individual responsibility and empowerment. This variable 
indicates how social policies adapt to differences in the population through 
measures to individualise services, and how far social policies diverge from old 
schemes of resource scattering.
 8. Prevention policies and social investments. This variable measures whether cit-
ies are proactive in recognising social problems. It allows identifying cities that 
have a systematic approach towards social policies.
 9. Changing or stable social-policy orientations. This variable measures cities’ 
orientations towards innovation in regard to social policies.
The context of the production of social policies was summarised through three key 
variables:
10. Federalism and local autonomy. This variable measures the independence and 
financial autonomy of the city from national social policies. It also measures 
the strength of the local welfare state.
11. Co-decision logics of local welfare-state institutions (participation in networks 
of actors) and co-operation with non-profit organisations in the production of 
social policies.
12. The dominant welfare mix. This variable measures the degree to which the pro-
duction of social policies is distinguished by logics oriented towards the state 
or society (non-profit organisations).
In all cities, qualitative and partially quantitative data have been collected, permit-
ting us to describe the different ways in which social policies and social innovations 
are produced and how they are embedded.8 The data concerning the 12 variables are 
largely descriptive and were interpreted in various meetings involving the authors 
of the individual city reports until we arrived at a consensus concerning a general 
classification of each city through a simple scheme of representations of the values. 
Following the logic of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA, see Ragin 1987) 
we dichotomised all variable values as 1 or 0 (some disputed cases received the 
value 0.5). The result was a sort of truth table indicating the combination of the 
presence or absence of specific characteristics from the above-mentioned variables. 
8 City reports are available on the WILCO project’s website: www.wilcoproject.eu.
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In the first step, all variables were eliminated that indicated the same value. These 
variables describe common trends for all cities (presented in Chap. 4.1), while the 
other variables describe the configuration specific to each city (see Table 2.1).
For general information about the data collection during this part of the project, 
we refer the reader to the introductory chapter. For specifics on the data collection 
and sources for each of the 20 cities and for the city chapters in this volume, we 
refer to the city reports available on the project website www.wilcoproject.eu.
The comparative analysis then tried to simplify the results of the truth table in 
different ways. First, it isolated variables that have the same or similar values (in 
Table 2.1, they are in italics); they probably influence social policy outputs but are 
not likely to determine key differences between cities. Second, it reorganised the 
table in a simplified way by putting forward similar constellations of variables. 
Table 2.2 indicates the final result of this reorganisation. Similar variables are ex-
cluded and cities with similar constellations or the same constellation are grouped. 
Four groups with similar constellations of variables resulted from this analysis.
Third, analysis had to address why certain cases are similar but nonetheless dif-
fer on some crucial variables. In Table 2.2, we identify four constellations and some 
varieties inside the constellations, which concern Varaždin, Geneva, Nijmegen, 
Plock, Warsaw and Zagreb (the explanatory differences are indicated in light grey). 
For the cities of Eastern Europe, we undoubtedly found that the explanation for the 
specific constellation of variables that places them in a given group is the strong 
influence of the EU on local social policies. Concerning Nijmegen and Geneva, the 
presence of a coalition government (the first variable in the table) is explained by 
the logic of the political system, which favours coalitions (Kriesi 1996). It is less 
easy to explain why Geneva is in the second group even though it is embedded in a 
strong federalist context. Patricia Naegeli, in her chapter in this book, explains this 
specificity through Geneva’s political orientation towards France. Naegeli argues 
that Geneva uses federalism to organise decision-making and policies according to 
a hierarchical, state-oriented logic, putting it nearer to French cities. Finally, we had 
to make sense of these groups and argue for a typology.
2.3  A Typology of Urban Governance
Analysing our 20 cities, we focused on common trends and main differences. We 
were interested in particular in a constellation of variables used to develop a typol-
ogy, more than on causalities, that were hard to postulate for such extreme differ-
entiated realities. Nevertheless, in the conclusion, we describe some elements that 
seem to indicate some kind of relation between a governance style and the potential 
for social innovation.
Regarding the common trends, all cities are experiencing major challenges and 
transformations in their attempts to improve the competitiveness of their economy 
without exposing the population to increased social threats. In the area of social pol-
icies, the driving forces are related to the competition between cities in the context 
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of the diminishing strength of the welfare state at the national level (as underlined 
by Kazepov 2008, 2005). Cities have been forced to increase their economic attrac-
tiveness by social challenges. If cities are not able to handle social problems, not 
only do they no longer attract new investors but existing investors also disappear, 
together with innovative elites (Häussermann et al. 2004).
In this context, the national welfare state not only finds it difficult to respond to 
urban social problems from the financial point of view, but it is also limited by the 
complexity required by policy answers. The regional and urban levels thus appear 
best suited to provide adequate services for complex social problems. There is no 
new front between national and urban levels, but there is a rearrangement of the 
welfare state, in which, as in the nineteenth century, the local (and in particular the 
urban) level becomes increasingly important (Reulecke 1995).
In this context, it is not surprising that cities in federal states (like Bern or Mün-
ster) have fewer difficulties in responding to these challenges or that cities’ room 
for manoeuvre depend on their economic strengths (as with Geneva and Nijmegen) 
and their political relevance. The contrasting figures are cities in unitary states that 
exhibit poor economic performance or that are marginal in their country or region. 
In our sample of cities, we find this weakness in Plock (Poland), Varaždin (Croatia) 
and Pamplona (Spain).
2.3.1  Major Policy Trends in the Governance of Social 
Challenges
These shared driving forces produce similar policy results, to a greater or lesser 
degree. Thus, common to urban policies in the area of social problems is the idea of 
Table 2.2  Grouping similar constellations: Towards a typology. (Source: WILCO project 2014—
city reports) 
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enablement: people, agents and networks must be helped to become as autonomous 
as possible. The legislative framework for such policies must be flexible in order 
to permit the continuous adaptation of policies, following evaluations and experi-
ments. Consequently, urban social policy is characterised more by pragmatism than 
by ideology or populism. In particular, the orientation in concrete situations opens 
a field of compromises and consensus, but also possibilities for preventive think-
ing. Four specific common trends in the governance of social challenges can be 
highlighted: co-production, a capabilities-based approach, decentralisation and ter-
ritorial focalisation:
• Co-production indicates the growing model of partnerships between public, for- 
and non-profit organisations found in all 20 cities (for the concept of co-produc-
tion, see Verschuere et al. 2012). The common trend indicates a transformation 
from state- or economy-driven urban governance to the co-production of policies 
and services.
• Investment in individual capabilities is the second common trend in these cities. 
It can take different forms, like individual accountability for solving problems, 
help to empower people to help themselves and orientations towards differences 
and capabilities. The trend has clearly moved from a perspective that focuses on 
welfare recipients to one that focuses on persons and person-centred services.
• Common to all cities is also a focus on democratic decentralisation. Instruments 
like participatory projects and mechanisms in neighbourhoods open public ad-
ministrations democratically. The trend is away from a hierarchical decision-
making system towards forms of co-decision-making.
• A final trend concerns the ways problems are addressed. In the cities we ana-
lysed we noted tendencies to focus less on groups and more on situations and 
territories, that is, to analyse concrete contexts before intervening and to act pre-
ventively through urban planning instruments and neighbourhood involvement. 
The general trend is away from specific problem orientation towards the search 
for a better quality of life in the city, for the wellbeing of inhabitants and visitors 
(commuters or tourists).
Beside these common trends, the 20 cities are characterised by some major differ-
ences concerning the ways in which social policies are tailored and related to urban 
governance.
2.3.2  Urban Welfare Governance
Working with the data gathered in the WILCO project makes it possible to under-
stand how social policies are situated within each specific city’s logic of governance. 
Our 20 cities certainly have common features, but they differ in the ways in which 
social policies are ideologically and practically justified. Following the process of 
typologising presented before, including temporal dynamics and information about 
values and policy choices, we have identified four kinds of regimes characterised 
by different relationships between social and economic policies at the city level.
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The first type of governance can be called the governance of co-operation, which 
is characterised by the continuous search for synergies between economic and so-
cial policies. The political consensus is fragile, but it stabilises ambivalences in the 
city’s driving coalitions around the idea of the innovative or creative (Florida 2005) 
city. The coalition’s major orientation is towards fostering urbanity as a project and 
as a way of life, bohemian and innovative, open to differences and responsive to 
marginality. Through urbanity—and this is the guiding hypothesis of this type of 
governance—economic dynamics can be improved. From the organisational point 
of view, this governance style privileges welfare-mix solutions. Values that all ac-
tors share are the idea of urbanity, pragmatism and efficiency. Ideologies are sec-
ondary in the definition of policy priorities. Examples of this governance style are 
Amsterdam, Bern, Münster, Barcelona and Varaždin. Varaždin’s orientation was 
developed following guidance from the EU.
The case of Münster, analysed by Christina Rentzsch in this book, illustrates 
these synergies between social and economic interests. A tradition of subsidiarity 
that developed in the shadow of the Catholic Church is characteristic of Münster’s 
social-policy tradition. Similarly to Geneva, Münster, a mid-sized town in northern 
Germany, is embedded in a federal system that assigns many duties and responsi-
bilities in welfare and social-policy areas to the local level. In accordance with the 
tradition of a conservative welfare regime, public–private partnerships, in particular 
with non-profits, are a further hallmark of social-service provision in Münster. Since 
the city used to be economically better off than many towns in northern Germany, 
and specifically in the Ruhr region, Münster is well known for its high standards 
regarding the provision of social services. Core beliefs regarding the importance of 
social policy in creating a liveable city are deeply embedded in Münster’s Catho-
lic tradition and have always been supported by the Christian Democratic Union, 
which remains the most important political force in the city. Although the dominant 
role of the Christian Democrats has been increasingly challenged since the 1970s, 
first by the Social Democrats and nowadays by the Green Party, neither the Social 
Democrats nor the Greens follow a neoliberal course questioning the necessity of 
policies trying to safeguard social cohesion.
But does the tradition of subsidiarity combined with a conservative party in 
power provide a fruitful ground for social innovation? The answer, based on the 
results of our empirical work in Münster, is yes. However, the “yes” comes with a 
question mark, indicating that the city provides space for social innovation but must 
still overcome hurdles and avoid risks. In a nutshell, it is not easy to make social in-
novations sustainable in Münster. In particular, two requirements must be met. First, 
if the innovation is developed or at least significantly supported by the municipality, 
there is a high chance that it will be accepted. Second, from a marketing point of 
view, the innovation has to be framed and advertised according to rationales that 
are developed and shared by an inner circle composed of the city’s most relevant 
stakeholders. Interestingly enough, starting in the late 1990s Münster initiated its 
strategic development process, titled City Marketing, with the aim of making the 
city more attractive to high-potential investors, specifically in the areas of housing 
and upscale retail.
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Today, there are two core beliefs that are widely shared by Münster’s business 
community, chief administrators and key representatives of the two major parties. 
The first is an “investment frame” according to which any policy has to pay off in 
the long run. Hence also in the area of social policies, any initiative has to either be 
an “investment”, for example in human capital, or aim at enabling the respective 
individual, group or local community to become self-sustainable. The second is a 
so-called prevention frame, according to which action, in particular in the area of 
social policies, should be taken at an early stage in order to prevent a downward de-
velopment. Thus, the two frames correspond and are related to each other. In order 
to attain legitimacy, social innovations have to be in accordance with both.
However, social innovations also have to be initiated and promoted by “the right 
people” in town. The results of the WILCO project show that there is a relatively 
small circle of stakeholders in Münster who meet regularly in the various round-
table and working-group settings initiated by the municipal administration in which 
crucial policy issues covering a broad range of topics are discussed. Indeed, the lo-
cal parliament long ago stopped being the central forum for decision-making. Since 
Münster’s business community is very homogeneous, consisting primarily of retail-
ers and representatives of saving banks and insurance companies, the municipal 
administration constitutes “the spider in the net”: it sets the agenda and promotes 
new initiatives. Newcomers—social entrepreneurs that are not mainstream and do 
not belong to the inner circle of decision makers—find it difficult to be acknowl-
edged and accepted in Münster and to have their proposed social innovations vali-
dated. Hence the city is characterised by a co-operative governance arrangement 
as regards social innovation, but innovative concepts and new ideas have to make 
their way into the “inner circle” of decision makers in Münster in order to be heard 
and recognised.
The second type of governance, called governance of growth, gives priority to 
economic policies. The orientation is anti-urban, and politics are strongly influenced 
by economic interest groups. This growth-machine orientation (Molotch 1976) pri-
vatises social problems as individual faults. Pamplona, Dover and Birmingham are 
examples of the predominance of this kind of governance. Birmingham in the UK, 
analysed in this book by Nadia Brookes, Jeremy Kendall and Lavinia Mitton, is a 
fine example of a city that follows this model in its attempt to reconcile social and 
economic policies. In the nineteenth century, the city used to be the “workshop of 
the world”. Even today, Birmingham’s political and welfare culture is consistent 
with the paradigm posed by Adam Smith, according to which a vibrant economy is 
the most effective underpinning for community development. Accordingly, gover-
nance of growth assigns social policy a subordinate role. In the case of Birmingham, 
this subordinate role is consistent with the tradition of a liberal welfare regime in 
which the market constitutes the prime source of individual wellbeing. Hence, as 
Brookes, Kendall and Mitton argue, “the city council has focused over the years 
on the promotion of local economic development, and the two policy priorities of 
economic growth and labour market activation and social inclusion have usually 
been dealt with separately”.
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Additionally, Birmingham constitutes a textbook example of how a city that is 
embedded in a unitary state is not in the position to develop visionary social poli-
cies that are independent from those of the central government. Instead, the city, in 
particular in the area of social policy, follows a stop-and-go policy of investment 
and retrenchment in lockstep with the policy directives and money that emanate 
from London. Against this background, innovations in the area of social policy are 
generally small-scale initiatives that have a realistic chance of becoming sustainable 
if they encompass a “market dimension” and are based on an entrepreneurial con-
cept that safeguards at least some financial independence from London. The overall 
shift from traditional big-industry managerialism to the current entrepreneurialism 
of the service and creative industries might provide Birmingham with the ability 
to reconcile its governance tradition with the demands of today’s local economies. 
However, the social innovations that emerge from this environment are not likely 
to be able to surmount the decisive problems faced by a large segment of Birming-
ham’s population that is not well educated and does not have the skills to work in 
the increasingly important creative sector. Therefore, it is most likely that the divide 
between rich and poor, and hence between the entrepreneurs and workforce of the 
new economy on the one hand and those who continue to identify with the way 
of life of the old working class on the other, will grow further and will not be sig-
nificantly addressed by small-scale social innovations that largely translate into the 
production and provision of social services for specific constituencies.
The third type of governance, called governance of social challenges, gives pri-
ority to social-policy orientations in the production of services. Economic dynamics 
are handled parallel to social policies and are neither related to nor in conflict with 
them. This governance arrangement follows more traditional social-welfare policies 
in which the local state plays the primary role in the production and distribution of 
services. Political parties and party politics define this more paternalistic orientation 
in the area of social policy. Shared values are solidarity and the social responsibility 
of the state. Cities like Malmö, Stockholm, Geneva, Lille, Nantes, Nijmegen, Bres-
cia, Zagreb, Warsaw and Plock are examples of this kind of governance. Concern-
ing Zagreb, Warsaw and Plock, we find again that the EU is the dominant partner in 
defining this governance style.
In Sweden, Malmö is an interesting case study regarding social innovation. Sim-
ilar to Birmingham, Malmö used to be a major industrial centre. But in the 1970s, 
the city was hit hard by the downturn in shipbuilding. Rising rates of unemployment 
and the deterioration of urban areas were some of the results of this development. 
Since then, Malmö has had to struggle with societal and economic difficulties that 
are not very common in Sweden. Furthermore, Malmö’s population, probably due 
to its geographical location vis-à-vis Continental Europe, had always been com-
paratively heterogeneous. When transnational migration started to intensify, Malmö 
developed into the most popular destination for immigrants to Sweden. At least one 
third of the citizens in Malmö were not born in Sweden. In some parts of the city, 
more than 80 % of the residents are of foreign origin. Again, this is very unusual for 
Sweden. From an institutional perspective, Sweden, much like the UK, is a unitary 
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state, but unlike in the UK, Swedish local communities enjoy a larger degree of 
independence from central government because public administration in Sweden 
is modelled after Germany and its tradition of local self-government (Gustafsson 
1988).
Against this background, the central topic addressed in the contribution by Ola 
Segnestam Larsson, Marie Nordfeldt and Anna Carrigan to this book is whether, 
how and to what extent Malmö’s urban governance arrangement turns to social 
innovations in order to tackle the city’s decisive problems and societal challeng-
es. Again, the results of the empirical research conducted by the Swedish team in 
Malmö highlight a significant degree of path dependency in local politics and urban 
governance. There is no doubt that the city council attempted to attract new indus-
tries and shift Malmö’s economy from the “big industry” of shipbuilding to services 
in the areas of education, the arts and culture. In Malmö, like elsewhere in Europe, 
urban economic development is synonymous with establishing a service-, science- 
and arts-oriented industry.
However, similarly to Birmingham but for a very different reason, the city’s 
master plan of rebuilding the economy does not allow much space for social innova-
tion. Certainly, from a political point of view Malmö stands out for continuity. Very 
much in contrast to the rest of Sweden, social democracy has not been abandoned 
in Malmö since the recession in the 1980s. This decision translates into a situa-
tion in which norms and values that have always been linked to social democracy, 
such as “social justice” and “fighting inequality”, continue to have a strong impact 
on local politics in the city, thus keeping neoliberal thinking, which has definitely 
gained ground in Sweden over the few last decades, at a distance. The public sector 
and hence the local government still perceive themselves as responsible for ad-
dressing social problems in Malmö, which the authors of the chapter characterise 
as “a city of many welfare projects”. However, there is some space for social in-
novation, as the chapter also demonstrates. And again, the projects are in line with 
the Swedish tradition of empowerment since they are put in place with the aim of 
integrating citizens into the labour market. But in contrast to the past, integration 
is not achieved in the traditional way, through education. Instead, the innovative 
aspects of the projects—the social innovations—consist of on-the-job learning and 
the embedding of education and training within an entrepreneurial approach to-
wards societal problems.
A similar situation can be found in Geneva. Naegeli’s contribution provides an 
in-depth analysis of the multi-layered governance structure of welfare policies in 
the city and the greater metropolitan area of Geneva. In many respects, Geneva, 
when compared to other Swiss cities, constitutes a deviant case. According to Nae-
geli, Geneva, highly influenced by the French tradition of generous welfare ben-
efits, looks back to a legacy of state-oriented welfare policies that have always 
been backed by a coalition of leftist parties in power in the city’s municipal council. 
Although politics in the cantonal parliament have always been dominated by centre-
right parties, cantonal and city levels have never been in disagreement regarding the 
core values of the welfare domain. Solidarity, a society of opportunities and equality 
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constitute the key features of a value set that is shared by parties across the political 
spectrum. According to Naegeli, key players largely agree on core values, but they 
differ significantly regarding how they should be put into practice. The left favours 
state action and a more or less top-down approach of social-policy implementa-
tion that does not leave much space for innovative approaches. The conservatives 
are more in line with the Swiss tradition of subsidiarity, which favours bottom-up 
approaches that preferably include non-profit organisations, civic engagement and 
citizen participation.
Since Geneva is one of the most affluent cities in Europe, support for social proj-
ects is not a controversial issue. As Naegeli argues, there are many social programs 
and a multitude of actors and providers of services that “constitute a labyrinth of lo-
cal welfare organizations”. However, the availability of resources and the complex 
set of actors do not translate into a promising and supportive situation for social in-
novation. The reasons for this stalemate are at least twofold. First, the political and 
business communities are more or less disentangled in Geneva; the two do not have 
much in common. Accordingly, social and economic policies are not interwoven; 
they each follow a separate road. The social domain therefore has developed into 
a prime domain of party politics. Second, the political arena in the city of Geneva 
is dominated by the left, which favours low-profile social innovations enacted pri-
marily within state services. In sum, the city follows a more traditional approach 
towards social policy that addresses social challenges primarily through publicly 
funded programs and services.
Finally, we have identified a fourth, conflictual, type of governance of social and 
economic challenges. In this governance arrangement, the combination of a weak 
local government and strong economic and social interest groups creates conflict 
between economic and social investments. The value orientation in the area of social 
policies is a conflictual one, with an opposition between a social and an economic 
lobby. Each social policy creates a debate between individualism and individual 
responsibility on the one hand and solidarity and collective responsibility on the 
other. Berlin and Milan are examples of this conflictual governance arrangement.
In the last few decades, Berlin has developed into one of the most attractive cities 
in Europe. Why? Why, in particular, do youth from all over Europe come to Berlin 
as a location to study, to live and to party? Benjamin Ewert, who emphasises the 
path dependency of urban governance and urban development in Berlin, addresses 
this issue. In a nutshell, his chapter argues that Berlin—due to its special situation as 
a border city in the middle of Europe, where two very distinct political systems and 
ideologies used to meet—provides plenty of space for different lifestyles, new proj-
ects and what Germans called “alternative” orientations. Ewert portrays the former 
West Berlin as a bohemian city in which the arts and culture flourished during the 
Cold War and where artists from all over the world used to work and simultaneously 
look for the experience of living in a so-called “frontier city”.
The specificity of West Berlin during the Cold War was made possible by a very 
generous transfer system of public subsidies. Until the breakdown of the Soviet 
bloc, almost everything in Berlin—jobs, rents, theatre tickets, etc.—was subsidised 
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by the German Federal Government. In terms of urban governance, this benevolent 
situation translated into a decoupling of the city’s social and economic politics. Or, 
to put it differently, for a long time the ability to attract business was very limited 
in West Berlin, in particular due to the logistics of a city situated very much in the 
Soviet bloc. Therefore, confronted with a declining population, the prime goal of 
West Berlin urban politics was to keep the city attractive for newcomers, students 
and members of the so-called creative class of artists and bohemians. However, 
with the fall of the wall, the geopolitical situation of Berlin changed significantly. 
The city is again the capital of Germany. Even today, it lives on public subsidies, 
although support from the federal government has been reduced continuously since 
the 1990s. Confronted with many societal challenges, the government of Berlin, 
similar to other cities, started an economic development program in which the cre-
ative industries—arts, culture and fashion as well as so-called lighthouse projects—
play a decisive role.
Similarly to Malmö, however, urban governance in Berlin was and continues 
to be influenced by ideas and concepts from the left, social democracy included. 
With some interruptions in the 1980s and 1990s, the Social Democratic Party has 
been in power in Berlin. The research under the umbrella of the WILCO project 
has focused on the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, with a population of more 
than 270,000. Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is still perceived as one of the bohemian 
hotspots of Berlin. The district government continues the long-standing tradition 
of the left being in power. Currently, the district is governed by a coalition of the 
Green Party and the Social Democrats. But the Left Party also has a traditional 
stronghold in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. This situation translates into a policy ori-
entation in which social policy issues play a significant role, and in which the more 
traditional social policy orientation of the Social Democrats is combined with the 
more participatory and entrepreneurial attitude of the Green Party. But in sharp 
contrast to former times, resources are scarce, and the ability of the ruling coalition 
to significantly support social innovations with public money is therefore limited. 
Furthermore, in sharp contrast to former times, Berlin has become very attractive 
for investment, particularly in the area of housing, which for decades was a real “no 
go” for investors because of what was then a declining population.
In sum, Berlin is still perceived as an El Dorado for “cheap living” and creative 
work. This image is supported by the Berlin government and in particular by the dis-
trict government of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. However, due to fiscal constraints, 
Berlin increasingly faces difficulties in living up to its image. The tradition of urban 
governance in which social and economic policies are largely de-coupled leads to 
the paradox that Berlin is still perceived as the metropolis of societal innovation and 
bohemianism while it is simultaneously becoming increasingly similar to other big 
European cities, where the flip-side of economic prosperity is increasing poverty 
and social exclusion.
Milan, analysed in this book by Giuliana Costa, Roberta Cucca and Rossana 
Torri, provides another interesting case study of this conflicting relationship be-
tween economic and social challenges. In this city, social policies have shifted sig-
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nificantly during recent decades. The Italian centre of banking and commerce used 
to be known as a “benevolent” city with a long tradition of social policies aiming to 
safeguard social cohesion. The social domain was also perceived as necessary to a 
striving economy. “Milanese citizenship” translated into a situation in which resi-
dents of Milan could count on the provision of social services and welfare programs 
that were exceptional in Italy.
However, at the beginning of the 1990s the attitude towards social issues sig-
nificantly changed in Milan. The local government struggled with far-reaching cor-
ruption scandals that challenged the then widely accepted image of Milan as the 
place in Italy “where business and ethics went hand in hand”. Moreover, left-wing 
city governments were followed by centre-right coalitions headed by mayors from 
Berlusconi’s party. Accordingly, the city significantly changed its attitude towards 
“the social”. Social policies were no longer perceived as an investment in the future 
of the young generations of Milan, but instead as having a negative impact on the 
economic development of the city. The move away from classical social policy 
was intensified by the fiscal crisis and the need to introduce austerity politics. At 
the same time, rent and housing costs increased steadily, in particular in the centre 
of the city, while the local government simultaneously abandoned a housing policy 
that did not exclusively address the needs of the middle class but also provided af-
fordable housing for less well-off members of the community.
At the turn of the millennium, a new coalition came into power that was and 
continues to be of a more leftist orientation and which has tried to replace the re-
strictive social policies of the past with a new approach focusing more on social 
cohesion, citizen participation and a renewed social-policy agenda. However, times 
have changed significantly. Against the background of fiscal crises and decreasing 
support from the regional and federal governments, there is not much space for ei-
ther social innovations or social policies that genuinely make a difference. What the 
current government tries to achieve is in accordance with a policy approach found 
all over Europe. So-called lighthouse projects, currently the Expo, are implemented 
with the goal of both attracting investment and improving the image of the city. 
However, these high-profile endeavours are increasingly out of reach for large por-
tions of the Milanese population, who struggle to make ends meet. In other words, 
governance in Milan does not address social and economic issues simultaneously. 
Instead, the local government tries to promote the economy, and it takes action in 
the social domain only if there is a significant challenge, as can be seen clearly in 
the area of housing. The social innovation in this policy area, which is described 
in the chapter by the Italian team, strongly builds on a public–private-partnership 
approach. The policy is made possible through the initiative of a large Italian foun-
dation. Hence, this path of innovation shows some similarities to those in big cities 
in the USA—Harlem in the 1980s and Detroit today—where private-sector founda-
tions provide the seed money for innovative policies.
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2.4  Conclusion
The urban welfare model as it has been developed since the Middle Ages in Europe 
is challenged by different contemporary tendencies. First, and most obviously, cit-
ies’ approaches to social policy have to react pragmatically to the retrenchment poli-
cies of the national welfare system—as Grymer had already observed in the 1970s 
(Grymer 1979). Responsibilities are handed down to the local level, and problems, 
generally related to forms of new poverty, are visible.
Second, these social problems are rarely included in the general social-securi-
ty systems of the national level and need to be addressed through social policies. 
Therefore, the urban level is also the primary place in which new social problems 
appear, and it is also the level that is forced to find solutions for them. The general 
trend towards a more diversified society—including marginality and other social 
problems that come with this diversification—finds its multifaceted reality in the 
city. Marginalised groups of all kinds, and not only a rich elite, are attracted by the 
promise of the city as a place for self-realisation and freedom (Cattacin 2009).
Finally, cities are confronted with the double task of meeting the demands by 
international mobile elites to produce an urban climate of well-being while dealing 
with crime attracted by that same climate. As wealth and poverty become concen-
trated in cities, municipal governments are challenged by the need to create social 
policies to compete for the rich.
The 20 cities analysed here are confronted with similar problems and challenges. 
Social innovations constitute just one tool to adjust their urban policies to chang-
ing conditions. Despite very different settings, the social innovations identified and 
researched in our project show many commonalities, as described in Chap. 9. The 
involvement of civil-society actors, the co-production of services, mixed financial 
arrangements and the rediscovery of the spatial or better urban dimension of social 
policy initiatives are just some of the characteristics of current social innovations. 
This chapter has focused on urban governance as a premise of any policy develop-
ment. We have specifically asked whether and how urban governance may facilitate 
or hinder the development and sustainability of social innovations. We have worked 
with the hypothesis that context matters, and that the political, cultural and institu-
tional dimensions of a given setting therefore have to be taken into account when 
analysing the emergence and establishment of social innovations.
The results of our analysis are mixed. There is no one best solution. But our 
analysis indicates that urban governance embedded in a federal system seems to 
facilitate the emergence and sustainability of social innovations because the local 
level is in a position to address social challenges independently. A strong tradition 
of local self-government constitutes a highly suitable environmental condition for 
social innovation. The same holds true for subsidiarity as a policy approach through 
which to address societal problems with the support of non-state actors, prefer-
ably civil-society organisations. Local governance arrangements that make use of 
subsidiarity to organise social services are comparatively more receptive to social 
innovations proposed by social actors. In contrast, countries with a top-down and 
government-based tradition of social-service provision, which constitutes one of the 
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key characteristics of a social-democratic welfare regime, are rather reluctant to ac-
cept and integrate new initiatives into their repertoire. Finally, coalitions of core ac-
tors that share common norms and values acknowledging that capitalist economies 
have to take the social into account in order to be sustainable are also conducive to 
social innovation. Interestingly, it does not really matter whether these core values 
are based on a social-democratic or a conservative tradition. The difference between 
the two traditions translates into a difference in the instruments and tools used, as 
the examples of Malmö and Münster clearly indicate.
Although social innovations are necessary tools for the reform and adaptation 
of the welfare state to the new societal challenges of our century, we also have to 
address at least one caveat. The social innovations we analysed are all small-scale 
initiatives; they are not related to citizen rights. By and large, they have not been 
thoroughly integrated into urban policies. Therefore, we have to be sceptical of 
expectations that social innovations are the one and only solution to the difficulties 
and problems of our mature welfare states and capitalist economies.
At the same time, the results presented here indicate that urban (and local) wel-
fare is becoming increasingly important in dealing with social challenges. There 
is also evidence of common trends in the way social issues are tackled. An inter-
esting result concerns the way cities from countries recently integrated into the 
EU shape their social policies. In these cities, policy prescriptions (and financial 
support) from the EU play a primary role in the production of concrete social poli-
cies—while the other cities experiment more with bottom-up and local solutions. 
The question arises of how sustainable imported solutions are in comparison with 
endogenous ones.9 An answer to this question would require longer-term monitor-
ing, which could be based on dimensions and insights from our project.
However, this comparative analysis also opens other questions that we can only 
discuss briefly in this chapter. First of all, identifying contexts more open to social 
innovation, as we have done, can be interpreted as a recommendation to change 
the way policies are created in specific contexts. But this is only partially true. 
The reality we analysed indicates a link between the wealth of a given city and 
its way of handling social policies. Social innovation is probably easier if there is 
a context of liberal experimentation, but also if there is a government orientation 
towards funding such innovation. But if money is scarce, how can a government 
promote a more economically and socially sustainable city? As Gerometta et al. ar-
gue, we think that the first step has to be forms of self-organisation and civil-society 
initiatives (Gerometta et al. 2005) that can be the engine for a better quality of 
life—which is the foundation for the attractiveness and economic development of a 
city. It would be an error to think that the opposite approach—improving economic 
performance in a socially hostile context—has the same consequences because the 
flexibilised economy, based on mobility and creativity, needs more than money. 
In other words, there is an intimate relationship between the new growth-oriented 
city and social policies and social innovations that promote economic development 
9 This question is not a new one as the discussion of the imported state by Badie, who analysed 
how Algerian institutions suffered from French domination, shows (Badie 1987).
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while adequately responding to social challenges that cities—and no longer the na-
tional welfare state—have to deal with.
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